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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 22/07/2011

Accident number: 792

Accident time: 07:17

Accident Date: 02/07/2007

Where it occurred: AF/0719/08130,
MF0015, Kharzon
Village, Laja District,
Paktya Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: (17)

Date of main report: None
Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 22/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
protective equipment not worn (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT OCCURRED ON [Demining
group] ON JULY 02, 2007
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by the Area Manager of AMAC Southeast (Gardez) to
investigate the demining accident involving [the Victim] a deminer from [Demining group] DT25. The accident occurred at 07:17 hours on 02 July 2007 at task # AF/0719/08130/MF0015
located in Kharzon village, Laja district of Paktya province. The accident resulted left leg lost
to the deminer.
SUMMARY:
The mentioned task is an area, in which the POMZ and PMN mines have been laid by
Russians in 1980. The area was surveyed by [another demining group] on 11/04/2006 and
the clearance of the task was started by [another demining group] on September 2006, but it
was suspended in October 2006 as the weather became cold. On 01 April 2007 the clearance
operations was resumed by [Demining group] DT-25, which was being supported by MDU.
[The Victim] deminer was working in his lane and had some advancement on his working
lane. After he excavated a signal and found nothing he went to the safe area for rest and
when he was coming back on the lane that was cleared by him, suddenly the explosion
occurred. It shows that he had missed a mine.
As a result of the accident, the victim deminer lost his left leg. After receiving the first aid he
was evacuated to hospital.
CONCLUSIONS:
The following points were found by investigation team:
•

The deminer was working carelessly, because he excavated a signal and after he
found noting he did not check the area again by detector and that is the main reason
for the mentioned missed mine.

•

The team leader and section leader of the team were absent and the supervisor of
the project ignored the absence of two key personnel in command group.

•

Poor command and control is also considered as a contributing factor as the section
leader was absent and there was no one to control the victim

•

The deminer did not use PPE and this is considered another indicator showing team’s
poor command and control.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
•

The management of [Demining group] is advised to make sure that the command
group of their teams are present or if any member of command group takes leave, a
qualified person should be assigned to carry on as his temporary replacement.

•

Retraining of the team is recommended with focusing on the use of detector and
removal of the signal of the reading points.

2

•

[Demining group] Management is to make sure that the related field offices have
nominee(s) for replacement of any of the command group’s member in case he is
absent or on leave.

•

Team command group is to be taught how to conduct some quality check of the lane
cleared by deminers.

Victim Report
Victim number: 982

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: None

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "left leg lost to the deminer".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators found that there were not adequate field supervisors on site when the accident
happened, and that this was proven by the Victim’s failure to wear PPE. The secondary cause
is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the management failed to ensure that
there were enough field supervisors to control the Victim who was working inappropriately
and missed a PMN mine (large metal indication). He was effectively working without
supervision and without QA checks.
Inadequate training is listed under Notes because the investigators recommended that field
supervisors should have QA training and that the deminers needed retraining in detector use
and signal investigation procedures.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under Notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
been more responsible over sharing data than those internationals who presume greater
responsibility.
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